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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the impact of three age thresholds in British criminal law on 
self-reported offending: the possibility of custody at age 15, the switch from juvenile 
to adult law at age 18 and the switch from young offender institutions to adult prisons 
at age 21. Using longitudinal data from 2003 to 2006 I find strong evidence of 
discontinuous drops in self-reported crime at age 18 and 21. The effects are robust to 
various specifications of the age-crime relationship and to the inclusion of a wide 
range of controls, including arrests, court appearances and imprisonment. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In many countries the severity of expected punishment for a criminal depends 
at least partially on the criminal’s age: Adults are generally subjected to harsher 
punishments than juveniles, often young adults are treated more leniently than older 
adults and children below a certain age are usually exempt from any punishment. This 
paper uses longitudinal data on a sample of British individuals ages 10 to 29 to 
investigate self-reported criminal behavior around three relevant age thresholds in 
British criminal law. The first is at age 15 when individuals can be sent to a youth 
offenders institute for punishment, i.e., custodial sentences become possible. The 
second is at age 18 when individuals are tried in adult courts and can be sent to 
prison, in this case young offenders institutes, which are similar to adult prisons but 
have somewhat better staff-prisoner. Finally, there is another threshold at age 21 from 
which on individuals will be sent to regular prisons. My main findings are strong 
drops in self-reported criminal behavior at the ages of 18 and 21. These findings are 
robust to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables and different specifications 
of the age-crime relationship. They are also stronger for individuals who offended 
prior to reaching the threshold. 
In general, any drop in offending at the thresholds could be due to deterrence 
or incapacitation effects, i.e., individuals could refrain from offending as they fear the 
tougher potential punishment (deterrence) or because they are more likely to be 
incarcerated and consequently not in a position to commit any crime (incapacitation). 
My data contain information on incapacitation as well as on arrests by the police and 
court appearances, which allow me to check whether effects differ when only looking 
at individuals without contact with the police. The estimates for this subgroup are 
essentially identical to the base estimates, which is not surprising as only 12 
individuals in the data have ever been to prison (and in fact only 2% have ever 
appeared in court and only 5% have ever been arrested). This implies that my 
estimates can essentially be seen as deterrence effects. 
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first is the large and well-
established literature on the effects of tougher punishments on crime (see, e.g., 
Freeman, 1999, and Klick and Tabarrok, 2012, for surveys).1 The second is the much 
smaller and recently emerging literature on the effects of increases in punishment 
severity when an individual transfers from juvenile to adult criminal law on (re-
)offending.2 In an analysis of US states Levitt (1998) finds large drops in crime rates 
at the age of majority, which are stronger for states where the switch to adult courts 
results in more punitive sanctions. Hjalmarsson (2009) and Lee and McCrary (2009) 
both exploit discontinuities in the probability of being convicted to a prison sentence 
at age 18. Based on court data from Washington Hjalmarsson (2009) finds evidence 
that these tougher punishments reduce recidivism, while Lee and McCrary (2009) 
find decreases in the likelihood of offending at the age of 18 in a sample of convicted 
felons in Florida. In contrast to these two studies that both use micro-data from court 
records on arrested offenders, I focus on self-reported crime in a random sample of 
young people living in England and Wales. My dataset – the longitudinal version of 
the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey for 2003 to 2006 – primarily covers crimes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For recent contributions see, e.g., Levitt (1996), Helland and Tabarrok (2007), 
Drago, Galbiati and Vertova (2009), Iyengar (2009) or Sloan et al. (2013) on general 
increases in the toughness of sanctions and Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003) on 
prison conditions. 
2 There is also a small literature on the determinants of youth crime more broadly, see, 
e.g., Levitt and Lochner (2001) or Mocan and Rees (2005).  
for which the offender was not arrested, charged or convicted and also contains a 
range of background characteristics that can be used for sensitivity analyses.  
In terms of identification, my research design is similar to a within-person 
sharp regression discontinuity design, where I use individual fixed effects regressions 
to estimate changes in self-reported offending when individuals cross one of the age 
thresholds at 15, 18 and 21. As these threshold effects are effectively discontinuities 
in an age-offending profile it is crucial to model the functional form of age correctly. 
In this paper I rely on two approaches: The first is a global polynomial in age, which 
fits the commonly observed cross-sectional pattern that crime rates increase until the 
mid-teens and then decrease again (e.g., Levitt, 1998). The second approach uses 
restricted cubic splines with knots set at the respective age thresholds. This approach 
is similar to allowing for different trends in the forcing variable at each side of the 
threshold in a normal regression discontinuity design. In practice, the results are 
robust to these choices. The results, including the magnitude of effects, are also robust 
to the inclusion of a large set of controls, including education, employment status, 
marital status, attitudes towards crime and the local area and a range of lifestyle 
variables capturing things like victimization, peer problems with the police, going out 
or drinking. In line with the standard Becker model of crime (Becker, 1968), its later 
dynamic extensions (Lee and McCrary, 2009; McCrary 2012) and the evidence 
mentioned earlier I find strong drops in offending at both age 18 and 21. There is very 
little change in offending at age 15, which might be due to a variety of reasons such 
as youth offenders institutes being seen as less punitive than jails (see Levitt, 1998, 
for some anecdotal evidence on this) or individuals at that age being not mature 
enough to think the consequences of their actions through.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly 
describes the institutional background. The data is described in section 3, section 4 
deals with identification and estimation. Results are in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
II. Institutional details 
 
The age of criminal responsibility in the UK is 10 (Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, section 34). Up to their 18th birthday, individuals would generally be tried in a 
youth court, even though they can be tried as adults in exceptional circumstances.3 
Youth courts can sentence individuals under the age of 18 to a detention and training 
order for offences that would normally lead to imprisonment. Under the age of 15 
they can only do so if the individual is considered to be a persistent offender (Power 
of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 100). These sentences would 
generally be served in a youth offender institution or a secure training center, while 
convicted offenders under 15 would serve an eventual sentence in a secure children’s 
home. For a very limited set of offences, notably some sexual offences and firearm 
offences, the Crown Court can sentence a juvenile to be detained for a period up to 
the length of a corresponding prison sentence for an adult (Power of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000, section 91). Finally, juveniles convicted of murder must be 
sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure (Power of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000, section 90), i.e., for an indefinite amount of time with regular 
reviews of whether the sentence can be deemed complete.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 These cases are very rare. A prominent example is the trial of Robert Thompson and 
Jon Venables, who abducted, tortured and murdered the two-year old James Patrick 
Bulger in 1993, when they were 10. 
From the age of 18 onward, offenders are generally tried in adult courts, i.e., 
depending on the severity of the offence in Magistrate courts or the Crown Court. 
Until the age of 21 offender would generally be detained in a young offenders 
institution (Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, sections 96 to 98), 
which are similar to adult prisons but tend to have somewhat better conditions than 
regular jails and a stronger focus on education and training.  
This system creates the following three discontinuities in the severity of 
punishment: 
• At the age of 15 it becomes possible (except for some very rare circumstance) 
to be sentenced to a custodial sentence, usually a detention and training order. 
• At the age of 18, individuals are generally tried according to adult law and can 
be sent to prison – in this case usually young offender institutions. 
• At the age of 21, custodial sentences would be served in regular adult prisons. 
 
III. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
This paper uses the four-year panel version of the Offending, Crime and Justice 
Survey (OCJS) for the years 2003 to 2006. The data were collected by BMRB Social 
Research and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) on behalf of the 
Home Office with the aim to provide a longitudinal picture of the prevalence of 
offending and drug use among the general population, in particular among young 
people. Consequently, the sample covers individuals living in England and Wales 
who were between 10 and 25 years of age at the time of the first wave in 2003. In 
each wave individuals from the previous waves were re-interviewed. In addition, 
refreshment samples were drawn in each year the survey was conducted. The version 
of the OCJS used here is the longitudinal version provided by the Home Office via the 
Economic and Social Data Service. It covers all individuals who were interviewed in 
each of the four waves the survey was conducted, in total 2539 individuals and 10,156 
person-year observations. 
Questions regarding criminal behavior were asked through computer-assisted self-
completion to minimize the risk of individuals over- or understating their activities. 
The main outcomes of interest are three dummy variables indicating whether an 
individual has committed any offence, a violent offence or a property offence in the 
respective year. I also consider various subtypes of crime, specifically theft of or from 
vehicles, criminal damage, burglary, robbery, other theft, assault and drug offences 
(production and distribution of drugs). The data also contains information on the age 
when specific offences were first committed, as well as information on imprisonment, 
court appearances and arrests that will be used in additional robustness checks. The 
key right-hand side variable is age, measured in years at the time of the survey. 
Finally, the data contains a large set of control variables that can also be used to 
assess the robustness of the estimates. These are standard socio-demographics such as 
education, marital status, employment status, whether the respondent has been 
brought up by both parents, self-rated health and whether the respondent owns or 
rents the house he lives in. Furthermore, the data also contain some information on an 
individuals lifestyle, specifically whether they go out to visit nightclubs and pubs and 
the frequency of these visits, whether they live in an area plagued by disorder 
problems, whether they get along with their parents and whether they have friends or 
family who are in trouble with the police. Finally, the dataset also has some 
information on individuals’ attitudes. These include information on whether they 
consider crime to be okay, whether they trust local people and whether they have a 
negative attitude towards the area they live in.  
After dropping observations with missing values from the estimation sample, we end 
up with an unbalanced panel of 2559 individuals with 9561 individual-year-
observations. Table 1 present descriptive statistics for the whole estimation sample. A 
substantial number of individuals have offended in one or more years with 23% 
admitting any offence, 13% a property offence and 15% a violent offence. Looking at 
the detailed crime categories suggests that the majority of crimes are either assaults or 
other theft, while drug offences, criminal damage or theft of or from vehicles are 
much rarer. Robberies and burglaries play essentially no role. Not surprisingly given 
the age range in the sample, the vast majority of respondents have not completed any 
education (yet), are still students and are neither cohabiting nor married.  
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.)  
 
IV. Empirical strategy 
The basic idea underlying the estimation strategy is that crossing one of the 
age thresholds in British criminal law should lead to discontinuities in an otherwise 
smooth age-crime-profile. One can think of this as a within-person regression 
discontinuity design based on panel data, not dissimilar to the ones used in 
Hjalmarsson (2009) and Lee and McCrary (2009), where the same individual faces a 
different risk of punishment as soon as it crosses one of the age thresholds. Similar to 
a normal (cross-sectional) regression discontinuity design there are two major threats 
to identification – the need to specify the functional form of age correctly and the 
assumption that a change in criminal behavior at the respective age can be attributed 
to a change in the relevant laws, i.e., the assumption that nothing else (that cannot be 
controlled for) changes at the respective age thresholds.  
In terms of the functional form, I rely on two different specifications. First, a global 
polynomial in age, which fits the findings by, e.g., Levitt (1998), that criminal 
behavior increases until the mid-teens and decreases afterwards. Figure 1, which plots 
age against the share of individuals having committed one the broad offences based 
on my estimation sample, suggests that this functional form might be reasonable. 
Figure 1 also suggest the existence of some discontinuities at age 18 and 21 for both 
general offences and property offences (panels a and b), while the picture is less clear 
for violent offences (panel c). These figures may provide a different picture than the 
estimates as they use variation within and between individuals, while the estimates 
will only use the former. 
(Figure 1 about here.) 
The second specification uses a highly flexible restricted cubic spline in age with 
knots being placed at the respective age thresholds. This specification assumes that 
the relationship is linear up to the first and after the last knot. Between the respective 
knots it is assumed to follow a piecewise cubic polynomial, where the slope may be 
change at each knot (see, e.g., Harrel, 2001, p. 20-26). This specification is essentially 
equal to the usual practice of allowing the slope of the forcing variable in a regression 
discontinuity design to differ on both sides of the relevant threshold. We will see that 
both approaches yield essentially identical results. 
The second assumption is obviously a bit trickier as several things might change at a 
certain age, in particular at age 18. Not all of these will have a very strong 
relationship with crime, for instance the fact that from the age of 18 individuals can 
marry without their parents’ consent would not necessarily be expected to have a huge 
impact on criminal behavior. However, as I use annual data it is entirely possible that 
children move out from their parents’ house or start working in they year they turn 18. 
Fortunately, my data contains a relatively rich set of controls that can be used to 
assess the robustness of the results when attempting to control for changes in socio-
demographic characteristics, attitudes or variables capturing lifestyles and peers. As 
we will see the results barely change when including a wide range of observable 
variables, which makes the possibility of unobservables playing a large role seem 
somewhat less likely. 
My basic estimation equation is 
Cit = α(i) + β’Xit + g(ageit) + τ1 * below 15it + τ2* between 18 and 20it 
 + τ3* over 21it + εit,         (1) 
where Cit is a measure of crime, α(i) is an individual fixed effect or in an alternative 
specification a normal constant, Xit are individual level control variables that differ 
between specifications, g(ageit) is either a second-order polynomial in age or the 
cubic splines described earlier and εit is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated with 
all the age variables conditional on αi and Xit. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering within individuals. The key variables of interest are three dummies for 
being below 15, being between 18 and 20 and being over 21. τ1 to τ3 give the effects 
of passing the respective age thresholds on criminal behavior. If the tougher 
punishments at each age threshold matter, we would expect τ1 to be greater than zero 
and τ2 and τ3 to be smaller than zero.  
Note that in the specifications including individual fixed effects, τ1 to τ3 are identified 
through those individuals who cross one of the age thresholds. Given the length of the 
panel, this implies that these estimates effectively rely on a sample within 3 years of 
each age threshold. This in turn attenuates further concerns about the specification of 
the age variable, as the resulting design is similar to  a regression discontinuity design 
using only observations in the neighborhood of the threshold. 
There is a final problem with equation (1) due the way age and crime information is 
collected: Age generally refers to the age at the time of the survey while the 
information on crime refers to the previous year. This fact implies that the observation 
where we observe, say, a switch from 17 to 18 will contain some information on 
crime that relates to a time when the individual was still 17. This measurement error 
will bias the estimates downward, which means that all estimates at the thresholds 
should be seen as lower bounds. 
V. Results 
Table 2 shows the base estimates based on equation (1). Columns (i) to (v) are based 
on the specification using a polynomial in age, columns (vi) to (viii) use the cubic 
splines. Columns (i) and (vi) are based on simple linear regressions without the 
individual fixed effects. Columns (i), (ii), (vi) and (vii) only include age and the age 
threshold dummies. Control variables are added in blocks in columns (iii) and (iv). 
Columns (v) and (viii) are based on a specification using all control variables.  
(Table 2 about here.) 
The first thing to note is that results are generally very similar across columns, 
implying a strong robustness of the results to the functional form used for age and to 
the addition of further control variables. As age is clearly exogenous, it is also 
reassuring that the estimated effects do not change when including individual fixed 
effects. The second thing to note is there does not appear to be any effect at the age-
15 threshold. Point estimates are always close to zero and never statistically 
significant. For the other two thresholds, all estimates suggest an economically large 
and statistically significant decline in criminal behavior. When turning 18 individuals 
become between 8% and 10% less likely to commit any offence, between 4% and 6% 
less likely to commit a violent offence and between 8% and 9% less likely to commit 
a property offence. At age 21 the effects are even larger with individuals becoming 
15% less likely to commit any offence, between 8% and 9% less likely to commit a 
violent offence and between 12% and 14% less likely to commit a property offence. 
Note that this pattern of results is plausible if offenders consider youth or young 
offenders institutions to be less severe than adult prisons, which seems plausible in 
light of the (anecdotal) evidence found by Levitt (1998). It is also plausible to find 
stronger effects for property crimes, which can be considered to be more rationally 
planned than (more affectual) violent crimes. 
As already mentioned in the introduction it is usually not clear whether drops in crime 
rates through tougher punishments are due to deterrence or due to incapacitation. My 
data contain information on contacts with the criminal justice system, be it 
imprisonment, court appearances or arrests by the police, which allows me to 
investigate this issue. In table 3 I re-estimate the base estimates omitting individuals 
who ever had a prison sentence in column (i) and individuals who ever were arrested, 
ever had a court appearance or were ever sentenced to prison in column (ii). The 
resulting estimates can be seen as pure deterrence effects as the individuals remaining 
in the sample never had any contact with the criminal justice system. 
(Table 3 about here.) 
The estimates are broadly similar to the results in column (vi) in table 2, which are 
based on the same specification. Turning 15 again has no discernible effects on any 
sort of criminal behavior, while turning 18 or 21 both lead to economically large 
reductions in criminal behavior. All point estimates are of broadly the same size as 
those in table 2 with an overall tendency of slightly smaller effects in table 3. 
However, differences in the point estimates between tables 2 and 3 are never 
statistically significant.  
Table 4 presents estimates stratified by prior offending. The basic specification is 
again identical to column (vi) in table 2. The estimating equation is  
Cit = αi + β’Xit + g(ageit) + τ1 * below 15it + τ2* between 18 and 20it  + τ3* over 21it  
+ τ4 * (below 15it * offended before 15i) + τ5* (between 18 and 20it * offended before 
18i)+ τ6* (over 21it * offended before 21i) + εit,     (2) 
where offended before Ti are a set of dummies that are “1” if an individual has 
committed an offence before age T. Column (i) introduces interactions with prior 
property offences, while column (ii) looks at prior violent offences. There are some 
reasons why we might expect effects to differ between individuals with and without 
prior offending. First, individuals with prior offending might already be hardened 
criminals for whom deterrence is less effective than for the general population. 
Second, individuals might become more cautious if a future arrest increases the 
probability that past crimes are detected and are subsequently treated as aggravating 
factors in sentencing decisions. Remember, however, that most individuals did not 
have any prior contact with the criminal justice system, i.e., the second effect would 
run through the higher detection probability of past crimes once the individual has the 
attention of the police, not just mechanistically through past convictions being taken 
into account in sentencing decisions. In the first case, we would expect lower changes 
in criminal behavior for those with prior offences (i.e., τ4, τ5 and τ6 > 0), whereas the 
second case would imply a stronger reaction for those individuals (i.e., τ4, τ5 and τ6 < 
0).  
(Table 4 about here.) 
The evidence in both column (i) and (ii) suggests that deterrence is stronger for 
individuals who have already offended: Effects for individuals without prior property 
offences are always close to zero, while effects for individuals with prior property 
offences are negative and large at all age thresholds for general offending and 
property offences and negative and large at the age-18 and 21 thresholds for violent 
offences. For prior violent offences the picture is slightly more complex: We observe 
declines in all crimes at all age thresholds for individuals with prior offending. For 
those without, we observe declines in property crimes at age 18 and 21, while violent 
crimes tend to increase at both thresholds. There is a certain risk that these patterns 
just represent regression to the mean effects, where prior offenders become less likely 
to offend and prior non-offenders become more likely to offend. However, there are 
two reasons why this explanation appears to be less likely: First, the prior offending 
might lie several years in the past and second, if it was a case of pure regression to the 
mean, we would expect to see an increase in offending for individuals without prior 
offences in addition to the decline in offending for those with prior offences, which is 
clearly not the case. 
(Table 5 about here.) 
Finally, table 5 looks into several sub-categories of criminal offences, specifically 
theft of or from vehicles, criminal damage, burglary, robbery, other theft, assaults and 
drug offences (distribution and production). For violent crimes, it is apparent that 
drops in assaults can explain all reductions observed in table 2 as point estimates are 
practically identical. There are also large decreases in drug offences at all thresholds. 
In terms of property crimes, the largest decreases are observed for other theft, 
followed by vehicle theft and criminal damage. The effects on burglary and robbery 
are much smaller and often practically zero. These effects are not particularly 
surprising in light of the descriptive evidence in table 1, as burglary and robbery are 
both relatively rare events, while vehicle theft, criminal damage and other theft are 
considerably more common. 
Overall, the estimates indicate strong reductions in criminal behavior around two 
relevant age thresholds – the switch from juvenile to adult law at age 18 and the 
threshold from which individuals can be sent to adult prisons at age 21. These 
reductions are found for both property and violent crime and appear to be robust to 
the specification of the age-crime-relationship and the inclusion of a wide range of 
control variables. The effects appear to be primarily driven by individuals with prior 
offending and by reductions in assaults and theft. They are also in line with earlier 
evidence from the US that uses court records instead of self-reported crime 
(Hjalmarsson, 2009; Lee and McCrary, 2009). 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper investigated changes in self-reported criminal behavior around three 
relevant age thresholds in British criminal law – the possibility to be sentenced to a 
custodial sentence at age 15, the possibility of being send to prison instead of youth 
offenders institutions at age 18 and the switch from young offenders institutions to 
regular prisons at age 21. I used longitudinal data from the Offenders, Crime and 
Justice Survey, covering a random sample of young people between 10 and 29 
residing in England and Wales for the time period 2003 to 2006. My estimates, 
relying on sharp deviations from otherwise smooth age-crime-profiles in individual 
fixed effects regressions, suggest sharp decreases in criminal activity at both age 18 
and 21. These results are robust to two different specification of the age-crime 
relationship and to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables, including socio-
demographics and proxies for attitudes and lifestyle. My data also allows me to 
control for contacts with the police or the criminal justice system. These estimates 
suggest that the effects are due to deterrence, but not due to incapacitation. Finally, 
there is evidence for considerable effects heterogeneity with drops in criminal 
behavior being strongest for individuals with prior offences. Effects are also strongest 
for theft and assaults.  
Overall, the evidence presented here suggests that tougher sentences, in this case 
various switches from juvenile to adult criminal law, indeed deter criminals. This 
finding is in line with US evidence on recidivism based on court records 
(Hjalmarsson, 2009; Lee and McCrary, 2009). The current paper adds to this literature 
by adding evidence for drops in criminal behavior that is never recorded by the police 
or the courts. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. 
Age 17.380 4.538 10 29 
Has degree 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Completed A-level 0.176 0.380 0 1 
Completed GCSE 0.189 0.391 0 1 
No eductaion 0.555 0.497 0 1 
Employed 0.252 0.434 0 1 
Unemployed 0.024 0.153 0 1 
Inactive (other than student) 0.070 0.254 0 1 
Student 0.655 0.476 0 1 
Married 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Cohabiting 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Has not been brought up by both parents 0.324 0.468 0 1 
Tenant 0.287 0.452 0 1 
Bad self-rated health 0.127 0.332 0 1 
Victim of a personal crime  0.255 0.436 0 1 
Victim of any crime  0.465 0.499 0 1 
Disorder problems in local area 0.678 0.467 0 1 
Does not get along with parents 0.037 0.190 0 1 
Peers or family in trouble with the police 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Visits nightclubs occasionally 0.424 0.494 0 1 
Visits nightclubs regularly 0.083 0.275 0 1 
Visits pubs occasionally 0.380 0.485 0 1 
Visits pubs regularly 0.226 0.418 0 1 
Ever drunk 0.148 0.355 0 1 
Considers crime to be okay 0.090 0.286 0 1 
Trusts local people 0.309 0.462 0 1 
Negative attitude towards local area 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Any offence last year 0.226 0.418 0 1 
Any property offence last year 0.125 0.330 0 1 
Any violent offence last year 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Any theft form or of vehicle 0.013 0.115 0 1 
Any criminal damage 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Any burglary 0.009 0.096 0 1 
Any robbery 0.002 0.046 0 1 
Any other theft 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Any assault 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Any drug offence (production & distribution) 0.029 0.168 0 1 
Individuals 2536 
Person-year-observations 9561 
 
 
Table 2: Age thresholds and self-reported crime 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Any offence 
Below 15 
(1 = yes) 
0.010 0.002 0.006 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.008 0.025 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Between 
18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.104*** -0.099*** -0.083*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.107*** -0.101*** -0.091*** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.153*** -0.157*** -0.147*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.128*** -0.145*** -0.145*** 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
Any violent offence 
Below 15 
(1 = yes) 
-0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.009 0.006 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Between 
18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.067*** -0.062*** -0.041** -0.046** -0.045** -0.067*** -0.062*** -0.045** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.094*** -0.095*** -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.094*** -0.086*** 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
Any property offence 
Below 15 
(1 = yes) 
0.010 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.007 0.019 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Between 
18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.091*** -0.092*** -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.083*** 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.128*** -0.139*** -0.130*** -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.109*** -0.126*** -0.123*** 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) 
Age Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Cubic 
spline 
Cubic 
spline 
Cubic 
spline 
Individ. 
fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Socio-
demog. 
variables 
No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Lifestyle 
variables 
No No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Attitude 
variables 
No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Individuals 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 
Person-
year 
observatio
ns 
9561 9561 9561 9561 9561 9561 9561 9561 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in 
parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Socio-demographic variables are: Dummies for having a university 
degree, having A-levels, having a GCSE, for being employed, unemployed and 
inactive, for being married and for cohabiting with a partner, for not having grown up 
with both parents, for living in a rented accommodation and for having bad slef-rated 
health. Lifestyle variables are dummies for going to clubs or pubs regularly or 
occasionally, for having ever been drunk, for living in an area with disorder problems, 
for having ever been the victim of any or a personal crime, for not getting along with 
one’s parents and for having peers or family who have trouble with the police. 
Attitude variables are dummies for considering crime to be okay, for trusting people 
in the local area and for having a bad attitude towards the local area one lives in. 
Table 3: Robustness check: Dropping individuals with prison sentences, court 
appearances or arrests 
 (i) (ii) 
 No individuals with 
prison sentences  
No individuals with 
prison sentences, 
court appearances 
or arrests 
 Any offence 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.024 0.027 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.092*** -0.093*** 
(0.021) (0.022) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.145*** -0.137*** 
(0.032) (0.035) 
 Any violent offence 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.007 0.018 
(0.018) (0.019) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.045** -0.050*** 
(0.018) (0.018) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.082*** -0.070*** 
(0.026) (0.027) 
 Any property offence 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.020 0.016 
(0.016) (0.017) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.084*** -0.082*** 
(0.019) (0.021) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.122*** -0.114*** 
(0.029) (0.0301) 
Age Cubic spline Cubic spline 
Socio-demog. variables Yes Yes 
Lifestyle variables Yes Yes 
Attitude variables Yes Yes 
Individuals 2524 2190 
Person-year 
observations 
9522 8263 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in 
parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. See footnote to table 2 for variable details.  
 
Table 4: Effects by prior offending 
 (i) (ii) 
 Prior property offence Prior violent offence 
Any offence 
Below 15 (1 = yes) -0.005 -0.026 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Between 18 and 20 (1 = yes) -0.026 -0.033 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
21 or older (1 = yes) -0.020 -0.061* 
 (0.034) (0.033) 
First offence younger than 15 * between 15 and 17 -0.132*** -0.188*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) 
First offence younger than 18 * between 18 and 20 -0.263*** -0.307*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) 
First offence younger than 21 * 21 and older -0.386*** -0.348*** 
 (0.060) (0.061) 
Any violent offence 
 b/se b/se 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.003 -0.043** 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
Between 18 and 20 (1 = yes) -0.016 0.044*** 
 (0.019) (0.016) 
21 or older (1 = yes) -0.018 0.047** 
 (0.029) (0.023) 
First offence younger than 15 * between 15 and 17 -0.016 -0.183*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) 
First offence younger than 18 * between 18 and 20 -0.082** -0.387*** 
 (0.040) (0.041) 
First offence younger than 21 * 21 and older -0.170*** -0.470*** 
 (0.051) (0.055) 
Any property offence 
 b/se b/se 
Below 15 (1 = yes) -0.022 -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
Between 18 and 20 (1 = yes) -0.004 -0.070*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
21 or older (1 = yes) -0.003 -0.096*** 
 (0.026) (0.029) 
First offence younger than 15 * between 15 and 17 -0.180*** -0.072** 
 (0.036) (0.029) 
First offence younger than 18 * between 18 and 20 -0.336*** -0.093** 
 (0.045) (0.038) 
First offence younger than 21 * 21 and older -0.405*** -0.122** 
 (0.057) (0.052) 
Age Cubic spline Cubic spline 
Socio-demog. variables Yes Yes 
Lifestyle variables Yes Yes 
Attitude variables Yes Yes 
Individuals 2536 2536 
Person-year 
observations 
9561 9561 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in 
parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. See footnote to table 2 for variable details.  
 
Table 5: Effects for crime sub-types 
 (i) (ii) 
 Theft of or from vehicle 
Below 15 (1 = yes) -0.000 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.016** -0.016** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.021** -0.021** 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 Criminal damage 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.004 0.007 
(0.010) (0.011) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.019* -0.019* 
(0.011) (0.011) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.046*** -0.041*** 
(0.015) (0.015) 
 Burglary 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.002 0.003 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.007 -0.007 
(0.005) (0.005) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.013** -0.012* 
(0.006) (0.006) 
 Robbery 
Below 15 (1 = yes) -0.003 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 Other theft 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.010 0.016 
(0.015) (0.015) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.084*** -0.085*** 
(0.019) (0.019) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.120*** -0.111*** 
(0.027) (0.028) 
 Assault 
Below 15 (1 = yes) 0.007 0.006 
(0.017) (0.018) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.045** -0.045** 
(0.018) (0.018) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.087*** -0.086*** 
(0.027) (0.027) 
 Drug offences (production and distribution) 
Below 15 (1 = yes) -0.015*** -0.016*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Between 18 and 20 
(1 = yes) 
-0.019** -0.019** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
21 or older  
(1 = yes) 
-0.056*** -0.056*** 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Age Quadratic Cubic spline 
Socio-demog. variables Yes Yes 
Lifestyle variables Yes Yes 
Attitude variables Yes Yes 
Individuals 2536 2536 
Person-year 
observations 
9561 9561 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in 
parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. See footnote to table 2 for variable details.  
Figure 1: Age-crime profiles 
Panel (a): Any offence 
 
Panel (b): Property offences 
 
Panel (c): Violent offences 
 
Note: The vertical lines mark the three age thresholds (between 14 and 15, between 
17 and 18 and between 20 and 21). Figures are based on the estimation sample. 
